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JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
This Court granted certiorari in this case in its order dated October 19, 2004. 
QUESTION PRESENTED 
"Whether the net amount to be paid for the underinsured damages of the petitioner, insofar 
as those damages potentially exceeded the policy limits, was a matter submitted to the arbitrator by 
the parties' arbitration agreement." 
BRIEF ANSWER 
The net amount to be paid for the underinsured damages, including those damages that 
potentially exceeded the policy limits, was a matter submitted to the arbitrator by the parties' 
arbitration agreement because the agreement submitted the issue of damages without stipulating 
either that policy limits would limit an arbitration award, or that the policy limits would not be 
disclosed to the arbitrator. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
The applicable provisions of the Utah Arbitration Act (2002) relating to the modification of 
an arbitration award are as follows: 
(1) Upon motion made within 20 days after a copy of the award is served upon the moving 
party, the court modify or correct the award if it appears: 
•kick 
(b) the arbitrator's award is based on a matter not submitted to them, if the award can 
be corrected without affecting the merits of the award upon the issues submitted.... 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-15(l) (2002). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
L Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Appeals in favor of Allstate Insurance 
Company, Wong's underinsured motorist insurer, affirming the trial court's modification of an 
arbitrator's award to $100,000 after the arbitrator awarded Wong a net award of $260,926.84. 
2. Procedural History 
Wong and Allstate arbitrated this case before an arbitrator. The arbitrator awarded Wong a 
net amount of $260,926.84. Allstate contested the arbitrator's award as exceeding the policy limits 
of the insurance contract and moved in Utah District Court, Third District, to either vacate or modify 
the award. The district court modified the arbitrator's award to $100,000. Wong appealed the 
district court's decision to the Utah Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals determined that the 
district court erred in modifying the award, but affirmed the outcome. Wong petitioned for 
certiorari, and the Utah Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
3. Statement of the Facts 
a. The Accident and Wong's Injuries 
On June 1,2001, Dixon Wong ("Wong") sustained serious injury in an automobile accident. 
(R.48). The driver of the other car was entirely at fault. (R.50). Wong suffered a shattered heel 
bone, lacerations to the leg and face, chip fracture to his elbow, and multiple other lacerations, 
bruises, and abrasions. (R.50). As a result of injuries sustained, Wong incurred $32,576.84 in 
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medical expenses. (R.51). Wong's shattered heel bone will require future surgeries costing 
approximately $22,000. (R. 51). His injuries cost Wong lost income totaling approximately $ 14,800. 
(R.51). His injuries also rendered him partially crippled with chronic pain, impairment of 
movement, and scarring. (R.52). 
b. The Disputed Claim 
Wong filed an under-insured motorist claim under his insurance policy with Allstate 
Insurance Company ("Allstate"). (R.6). Allstate denied his claim. Wong and Allstate disputed the 
amount payable to Wong under his under-insured motorist coverage. (R.6). For five months, until 
the day before the arbitration hearing, Allstate maintained an offer of $30,000 to settle the claim. 
(R. 44). After some negotiation, the parties mutually agreed to submit the dispute to binding 
arbitration. (R.48). 
c. The Arbitration Agreement 
Allstate and Wong, through their attorneys, signed an "Arbitration Agreement" and a 
"Binding Arbitration Agreement." (R. 47,49). The Arbitration Agreement, as drafted by Allstate, 
included a "high/low" agreement, stipulating a $100,000 limit on any arbitration award. (R.47). 
Wong's attorney lined out the high/low stipulation, signed, and returned the agreement to Allstate. 
(R. 47, 48). After Wong's modification, the clause containing the high/low agreement read: 
The parties agree to be bound by a high/low agreement with a high of $100,000 and a low 
of $0.00. The terms of this high/low agreement shall not be disclosed to the arbitrator. 
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Allstate's attorney signed the altered agreement. (R.48). On March 18, 2002, Allstate and Wong, 
through their attorneys, signed the Binding Arbitration Agreement, defining the dispute as 
"Underinsured Motorist Claim - Damages." (R.49). 
In letters written after the arbitration agreement was signed, Allstate's and Wong's attorneys 
disputed the effect of Wong's insurance policy limits on a potential arbitration award. (R.57, 58). 
Wong's attorney argued that the arbitrator was not bound by any policy limit. (R.57). Allstate's 
attorney countered that an arbitration award would be bound within the policy limits of Wong's 
insurance policy. (R.58). Wong's attorney, in his letter date May 14, 2002, stated that "[w]e had 
agreed that the arbitrator will not be made aware of either the terms of the Arbitration Agreement 
or the policy limits under the subject policy." (R.57). However, in his response letter dated May 15, 
2002, Allstate's attorney did not acknowledge an agreement not to disclose policy limits to the 
arbitrator. (R.58). The letter also expressed that Allstate would settle the claim for $70,000. (R. 58). 
Arbitration started the next day, May 16, 2002. (R. 50). 
d. The Arbitration Award 
On May 20, 2002, the arbitrator, Warren Driggs, decided in favor of Wong and awarded a 
gross award of $321, 616.85. (R. 52). The award was reduced for liability coverage and P.I.P. 
benefits previously paid, resulting in a net award amount of $260, 926.84. (R.52). The Arbitrator 
based his "findings and conclusions" on the medical opinion of a doctor, the "credible testimony" 
of Wong and his wife, the arbitrator's own observations, written evidence submitted by both parties, 
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and the arguments of the lawyers. (R.50, 51). During the arbitration, Allstate did not introduce 
evidence of policy limits in the insurance contract or otherwise contend that an award should be 
limited to $100,000. (Id) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Parties to arbitration control the scope of matters submitted in arbitration. Parties express 
their intentions regarding the scope of submission in their written agreement to arbitrate. When an 
insurer and an insured submit an issue to arbitration, policy limits may play one of two roles in the 
arbitration. First, if the parties either specifically agree to limit the scope of the arbitration to the 
policy limits, or agree not to disclose those policy limits to the arbitrator, policy limits may limit the 
scope of submission to an arbitrator. 
Second, if the parties neither mention policy limits in their arbitration agreement nor agree 
to withhold policy limits from the arbitrator, policy limits become an affirmative defense for the 
insurer. In this second scenario, the parties submit the entire issue of contractual obligation, 
including contractual limitations on liability, to the arbitrator. If the insurer fails to argue its 
affirmative defense in arbitration, it may not reassert its defense in an attempt to modify the award 
in court. 
Wong and Allstate submitted an issue to arbitration: the extent and nature of Allstate's 
contractual obligation to pay Wong's underinsured damages. In their Arbitration Agreement, there 
was no mention of policy limits limiting an available award, and the parties were not forbidden from 
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disclosing those policy limits to the arbitrator. Allstate did submit two items of set-off to the 
arbitrator, the No-Fault PIP benefits paid, and the third-party recovery amount. There was no 
apparent reason why it could not have submitted the policy limits to the arbitrator as an affirmative 
defense to any award exceeding those limits. By failing to do so, Allstate exposed itself to the risk 
that the arbitrator's assessment of its obligation might exceed those policy limits. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Standard of Review 
"[T]he standard for reviewing an arbitration award is highly deferential to the arbitrator" due 
to "long-standing public policy favoring speedy and inexpensive methods of adjudicating disputes." 
Buzas Baseball v. Salt Lake Trappers, 925 P.2d 941,946 (Utah 1996). A trial court's review of an 
arbitration award is very limited and restricted to the "statutory grounds and procedures for review." 
Intermountain Power v. Union Pacific RR.. 961 P.2d 320,322 (Utah 1998). In this case, the relevant 
statutory ground under review was Utah Code Annotated § 78-31 a-15 (2002).* It allows a court to 
modify an award if "the arbitrator's award is based on a matter not submitted to them." Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-31a-15(l)(b) (2002). 
1
 The Arbitration Act that the trial judge relied on was repealed, effective May 15, 2003, 
and replaced with the Utah Uniform Arbitration Act, effective May 15, 2003. Utah Code 
Annotated 78-3la-125 largely replaced 78-3la-15. 
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An appellate court reviews a district court's modification of an arbitration award with "no 
deference to the court's conclusions of law, reviewing them for correctness." Intermountain Power, 
961P.2dat323. 
II. Petitioner And Respondent Submitted The Entire Issue Of Allstate5 s Obligation To Pay 
Wong's Underinsured Damages 
"Arbitration is a matter of contract/' and it "is a remedy freely bargained for by the parties 
and provides a means of giving effect to the intention of the parties, easing court congestion, and 
providing a method more expeditious and less expensive for the resolution of disputes." Cade v. 
Zions First Nat. Bank, 956 P.2d 1073, 1076-1077 (Utah App. 1998). Like any other contract 
question, the matter submitted to an arbitrator is defined by the parties' intent. And, like any other 
contract, the parties' intent should be inferred from the Arbitration Agreement. Intermountain 
Power, 961 P.2d at 325 ("[T]he arbitrator deduced the parties' contractual intent directly from the 
language of the Agreement. This is as it should be."). In particular, the scope of submission is 
defined by the parties' agreement to arbitrate. Intermountain Power, 961 P.2d at 325; CFI v. 
Parkwest Associates, 40 P.3d 599, 605 (Utah 2002); Reed v. Davis County School Dist., 892 P.2d 
1063,1065 (Utah App. 1995); E.KO.C v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279,289 (2002). 
Ambiguities in an arbitration agreement should "be liberally interpreted" to expand the scope 
of arbitration. Docutel Olivetti v. Dick Brady Systems, Inc., 731 P.2d 475,479 (Utah 1986); Lindon 
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City v. Engineers Construction Co., 636 P.2d 1070,1073 (Utah 1981); King County v. Boeing Co., 
570 P.2d 713, 718 (Wash. App. 1977); Zimmerman v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 739 N.E. 2d 990, 
995 (111. App. 2000). "If the scope of an arbitration clause is debatable or reasonably in doubt, the 
clause should be construed in favor of arbitration." Docutel, 731 P.2d at 479; Mastrobuona v. 
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 62 (1995). 
The question of what was submitted to the arbitrator is resolved by looking at the objective 
evidence of the parties' intent. The objective evidence of the parties' intent is the Arbitration 
Agreement itself; there is no evidence that the arbitration was required by the insurance policy, and 
there is no incorporation by reference of any other terms, into the Agreement. In its original offer, 
Allstate expressed an intent for the arbitrator to be bound by an undisclosed "high" of $100,000. 
Wong, through his attorney, made a counteroffer that specifically excised any limits on the 
arbitrator's award. At this point, Allstate had a choice: it could either insist, in a counteroffer, on 
limiting the arbitrator's award according to the policy limits, or it could accept Wong's counteroffer 
and proceed with arbitration. Allstate chose the latter. 
Allstate was not forced to enter the Arbitration Agreement, as amended by Wong's attorney. 
Allstate is a sophisticated party that knew or should have known that it was submitting the entire 
issue of its obligation under the contract to an arbitrator. As such, it should have been prepared to 
present the arbitrator with evidence of a contractual limitation on Allstate's obligation. Finally, no 
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subsequent attempts at modifying the Agreement were successful,2 so the Agreement stood as it was 
when the parties' drafted it. 
The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the trial court's decision. Under the Court of 
Appeals' reading, the arbitrator's award was only an advisory opinion. The court held: 
The Binding Arbitration Agreement states that the issue to be addressed by the arbitrator is 
"underinsured motorist claim - damages." It does not state that any other matters are to be 
addressed such as the specific amount Allstate must pay Wong under his underinsured 
motorist policy. 
2004 UT App 193, f 13. However, the Court of Appeals looked to the wrong document to determine 
the scope of the arbitration. The "Binding Arbitration Agreement" was only a form document 
prepared by the arbitrator, to memorialize his being hired as an arbitrator. Presumably, the main 
purpose is to ensure that the arbitrator gets paid. It merely identifies which dispute the arbitrator is 
to resolve. On the other hand, the scope of the arbitration was found in the Arbitration Agreement 
prepared by the parties. The Court of Appeals could not really have believed that the parties intended 
their carefully drafted, eleven (11) paragraph Arbitration Agreement to be completely superceded 
by the arbitrator's handwritten "Underinsured Motorist Claim - Damages" notation on the 
arbitrator's retention form. Such an interpretation of the parties' agreement flies in the face of the 
use of arbitration as a final adjudication of a case. 
If the arbitrator was free only to determine, in the abstract, Wong's total damages, then the 
arbitration was only a preliminary fact-finding mission, to set the stage for further litigation under 
2
 See, infra, Part III.B. 
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the insurance policy. But the arbitration was not an evidentiary hearing or a preliminary skirmish; 
they did not intend merely to satisfy their curiosity regarding the amount of damages that Wong 
suffered. Instead, the parties intended the arbitration to resolve their whole dispute, not function as 
a pre-cursor to further litigation. 
III. The Policy Limits Did Not Define The Scope Of Submission In The Arbitration 
As the Court of Appeals admitted, Utah courts have not dealt with this issue before. Allstate 
Insurance Co. v. Wong, 2004 UT App 193, f 11. A series of recent Colorado cases have considered 
the effect of policy limits in arbitrations concerning insurance contracts. See Kutch v. State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 960 P. 2d 93 (Colo. 1998); Farmers Ins. Exchange v. 
Taylor, 45 P.3d 759, 761 (Colo. App. 2001); Applehans v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 68 P.3d 
594 (Colo. App. 2003). 
Colorado case law sets up two possible uses for insurance policy limits in arbitration. First, 
if the parties intend, policy limits may limit the scope of submission to arbitration by an express 
stipulation in the arbitration agreement. Second, the parties may agree to accept the policy limits as 
defining the scope of submission by stipulating not to disclose the policy limits to the arbitrator, but 
also expressly agreeing that the arbitrator's award be modified to conform to those limits. 
If the parties submit an issue of contractual obligation to arbitration without mentioning 
policy limits in the arbitration agreement, and there is no the policy limits do not define the scope 
of submission - they become an insurer's affirmative defense. This second approach recognizes that 
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when parties submit an issue of contractual obligation to an arbitrator, arbitration is the proper place 
to discuss any contractual limitation on such liability. 
This two-pronged approach satisfies the purposes and policies of arbitration in Utah. This 
approach both respects the role of the parties' intent in determining the scope of matters submitted 
to arbitration {see Intermountain Power, 961 P.2d at 325) and encourages the full and final resolution 
of cases, thus promoting arbitration as a means to ueas[e] court congestion, and provid[e] a method 
more expeditious and less expensive for the resolution of disputes." Lindon City, 636 P.2d at 1073. 
A. Analysis of Colorado Case Law 
In Kutch, the Colorado Supreme Court speculated that an arbitrator could exceed his 
authority by granting an award beyond insurance policy limits when an arbitrator ignores the policy 
limits in an insurance contract. 960 P.2d at 98; Swan v. American Family Mutual Insurance, 8 P.3d 
546 (Colo. App. 2000). However, in Taylor, the court distinguished Kutch and rejected a blanket 
rule requiring trial judges to modify all arbitrated underinsured motorist insurance claim awards to 
fit within policy limits. 45 P.3d at 763. The court explained that, in Kutch, "the arbitration provision 
limited the arbitrable issue to whether the insured was entitled to collect damages from the uninsured 
owner or driver, and the amount of those damages." Id. 
In Taylor, however, "the underinsured motorist benefit payable to the insured was specifically 
arbitrable and was submitted to arbitration." Taylor, 45 P.3d at 762-763. Therefore, the court held 
that "the policy limits and setoff amounts were affirmative defenses to the insurer's obligation to pay 
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benefits to the insured." Id. at 762. As such, they should have been presented during arbitration and 
not brought up in an attempt to modify the arbitration award. Id. The court explained that "parties 
to an arbitration are obligated... to present all relevant arguments, defense, and evidence during the 
arbitration." Id. In Taylor, the "policy limit was an affirmative defense to the insurer's obligation 
to pay benefits." Id. 
The Taylor court affirmed the trial court's confirmation of the award and rejected the 
insurer's policy limit argument because "the arbitration clause in this matter does not state that the 
Arbitrator is to determine the amount of payment subject to the policy limitations." Taylor, 45 P.3d 
at 762. The court quoted with approval the trial court's reasoning that "in light of... the fact that 
the Arbitrator in this matter was not presented with the policy limitations prior to or during the 
arbitration hearing . . . and the absence of any language qualifying the Arbitrator's power to 
determine the amount of payment within the arbitration clause, the Arbitrator had jurisdiction to 
determine the amount of payment that should be made, without qualification." Taylor, 45 P.3d at 
760-761. 
InApplehans, the court clarified the distinction made by Taylor. Appleham, 68 P.3d at 599. 
The court held that if "there was no stipulation . . . regarding policy limits . . . [then] the trial court 
should confirm the initial award in favor of plaintiff in excess of policy limits. Id. at 601. 
"However, if the court finds that the parties had stipulated to be bound by policy limits, to apply a 
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setoff, and not to submit those issues to the arbitrator, the court must vacate the arbitrator's initial 
award to the extent that it exceeds the policy limits and ignores the setoff." Id. 
B. By Failing To Introduce Evidence Of Policy Limits In Arbitration, Allstate 
Waived Its Affirmative Defense 
The arbitration agreement between Wong and Allstate contained no stipulation to bind the 
arbitrator's award within policy limits. (R.47). The Arbitration Agreement's stipulation of non-
disclosure of a high/low agreement is meaningless because the parties crossed out the high/low 
agreement prior to signing and executing the contract - there was no 'agreement' within that clause 
to disclose. (R.47). In short, the Agreement contained no reference to policy limits limiting the 
scope of submission, and the Agreement did not forbid any party from disclosing those limits to the 
arbitrator. 
Because the arbitration agreement contains no stipulation regarding the amount of award or 
the use of policy limits, Allstate had an obligation to present evidence, including the existence of a 
policy limit, during the arbitration to limit any potential award. Taylor, 45 P.3d at 762. Other setoffs 
were reflected in the arbitration award (R. 52); Allstate had an opportunity and obligation to present 
the policy limits in arbitration and not wait to present the affirmative defense of the existence of 
policy limits until the award is contested in court. Taylor, 45 P.3d at 762; Applehans, 68 P.3d at 599. 
In correspondence subsequent to the formation of the Arbitration Agreement, the parties 
never agreed to limit the arbitration award to the policy limits or to withhold the policy limits from 
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the arbitrator. Wong's attorney suggested an agreement not to disclose the "policy limits under the 
subject policy" to the arbitrator, but Allstate did not assent to such a stipulation. (R.57, 58).3 In 
order for Allstate to have been bound by a nondisclosure agreement, Allstate would have had to 
agree in writing. Pacific Development, L.C. v. Orton, 23 P.3d 1035, 1037 (Utah 2001) 
(Modifications to arbitration agreements must satisfy the writing requirements of the statute of 
frauds.). Allstate did not agree to modify the arbitration agreement to require nondisclosure; neither 
party was bound to keep silent. Taylor, 45 P.3d at 762; Applehans, 68 P.3d at 599. Therefore, 
Allstate was bound to bring its dispute over the effect of the policy limits to the arbitrator's attention 
during arbitration or waive this affirmative defense. Applehans, 68 P.3d at 599. Otherwise, excuse 
of Allstate's "procedural defaults . . . would undermine the use of arbitration as a method of 
resolving disputes efficiently, conclusively, and comprehensively." Taylor, 45 P.3d at 763. 
CONCLUSION 
The arbitration award in this case should be enforced against Allstate. In the absence of 
limiting language in the Arbitration Agreement itself, the arbitrator's award completely resolved all 
the parties' rights under the insurance contract. The arbitrator's net award, including the damages 
that may have exceeded the policy limits, was within the scope of submission, as determined by the 
parties' Arbitration Agreement. Allstate and Wong submitted the issue of contractual liability under 
the insurance policy without limiting the scope of submission to within the policy limits. Allstate 
3
 By the same token, Allstate suggested that they agree to be bound by the policy limits in 
the contract (R.58), and Wong disagreed. (R.57). 
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failed in the arbitration to present its affirmative defense of policy limits to its contractual liability. 
Allstate thus waived this defense and has no remedy against enforcement of the arbitration award. 
This Court should adopt the two-pronged approach (explained, supra, in Part III) to using 
policy limits in determining the scope of matters submitted in arbitration. This approach is supported 
by Utah public policy regarding arbitration. Utah public policy endorses three aspects of arbitration 
that are promoted by this approach: (1) the intent of the parties rules the process of arbitration and 
determines the scope of matters submitted; (2) arbitrators have the power to fully and finally 
determine all issues submitted to arbitration; and (3) once an issue is submitted, argued, and decided 
in arbitration, a party may not relitigate that issue, and courts have very limited grounds on which 
to review an arbitration. 
In the arbitration, because Allstate failed to present evidence of any contractual limitation, 
such as policy limits, on its liability to Wong, the arbitrator could not rely on any policy limits to 
limit his award. The trial court erred in modifying the award because it relied on an insurance 
contract that was extraneous to the Arbitration Agreement. By modifying the award, the trial court 
impermissibly reviewed the merits of the arbitration and the arbitrator's decision, by directly 
applying the parties' insurance contract. The determination of obligations and rights under the 
insurance contract was completely submitted to the arbitrator, and the trial court had no legitimate 
ground on which to second-guess the arbitrator's conclusion. 
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The Court of Appeals was in error, and this Court should reverse its decision and order 
enforcement of the arbitration award in this case without modification. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this _>_ day of January, 2005. 
Daniel F. Bertch 
Kevin R. Robson 
BERTCH ROBSON 
Attorneys for Petitioner Dixon Wong 
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Zachary E. Peterson (8502) 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2465 
n I / i 
).A S\„ Li l\y 1/ ^y \y^-f?^JI 
17 
ADDENDUM 
18 
ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER'S MOTION TO MODIFY ARBITRATOR'S AWARD 
(J. Bohling, December 16,2002) 
LYNN S. DAVIES [A0824] 
CHRISTIAN S. COLLINS [A8452] 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone-(801) 531-2000 
Fax No: (801) 532-5506 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
DIXON WONG, 
Respondent. 
ORDER GRANTING 
PETITIONER'S MOTION TO MODIFY 
ARBITRATOR'S AWARD 
Civil No. 020905129 
Judge William B. Bohling 
Petitioner Allstate Insurance Company's Motion to Vacate Arbitrator's Award, or 
n the Alternative, Motion for Modification of Arbitrator's Award, came on regularly and 
pursuant to notice before the above-entitled court, the Honorable Judge William B. Bohling 
residing, on October 31, 2002. Petitioner, Allstate Insurance Company, was represented by its 
counsel, Lynn S. Davies of Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson Respondent, Dixon Wong, was 
present and represented by his counsel, Preston L Handy of Siegfried & Jensen. The court had 
eviewed and considered all of the 
t hird Judicial District 
DEC 1 6 2002 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
By 
Deputy Clerk 
memoranda, exhibits, and filings pertinent to that motion, as well as related motions. The court 
heard argument from counsel for petitioner and from counsel for respondent. 
This case arises out of an underinsured motorist insurance policy, wherein Allstate 
Insurance Company was the insurer, and Dixon Wong was the insured. It is undisputed that the 
applicable insurance policy limits were in the amount of $100,000 for underinsured motorist 
coverage. Respondent, Mr. Wong, was involved in an automobile accident and recovered policy 
limits from the insurer for the tortfeasor in that accident, in the amount of $50,000. Respondent, 
Mr. Wong, then made a claim against petitioner, Allstate Insurance Company, his own insurance 
carrier, for his underinsured policy limits. Those parties were unable to reach an agreement as to 
the settlement value of the claim, and therefore agreed to invoke the provision of the underinsured 
motorist policy providing for arbitration of the claim. The parties, through their attorneys, 
entered into an agreement entitled "Arbitration Agreement," signed respectively by counsel for 
respondent, Mr. Wong, on February 5, 2002, and by counsel for petitioner, Allstate Insurance 
Company, on March 21, 2002. 
The parties, also through their attorneys, entered into a "Binding Arbitration 
Agreement" submitted to them by the arbitrator, Warren W. Driggs; on March 18, 2002, 
indicating that the "Nature of Dispute" was "Underinsured Motorist Claim - Damages." The 
matter was arbitrated on May 16, 2002 The arbitrator entered an award dated May 20, 2002, in 
the net amount of $260,926 84 
The court finds that the underinsured motorist policy constitutes a contract, and 
that the policy limits of $100,000 define the outer extent of exposure to petitioner, Allstate 
Insurance Company, on a claim for underinsured motorist benefits. An arbitration award in 
2 
excess of the $100,000 policy limits was beyond the reasonable expectations of the parties. The 
Arbitration Agreement did not operate to open or modify the terms of the insurance contract. In 
accordance with the applicable statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-14(l)(c)(1996), and applicable 
Utah case law, including Buzas Baseball Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 925 P.2d 941 (Utah 
1996), and Soft Solutions, Inc v. Brigham Young University, 2000 UT 46, ^14, 1 P.3d 1095, the 
court finds that the arbitrator exceeded his authority and power by entering an award in excess of 
$100,000, that the award is beyond the reasonable contemplation of the parties, and that the 
award lacks adequate foundation in reason or fact. The court finds that the insurance policy limits 
of $100,000 constitute a contractual determination of the parties, which are not modified or 
altered by virtue of the arbitration agreements. 
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the arbitrator's award is hereby 
modified to conform to the policy limits of $100,000, this Order to constitute a judgment in said 
amount as requested in the alternative by petitioner. Therefore, this matter is resolved in favor of 
Detitioner and against respondent. 
MADE AND ENTERED this l[p day of £ ) £ g . . 2002. 
BY THE COURT: 
M lAl&b 
THE HONORABLE WILLIAM B. BOHLING 
PRESIDING 
3 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN 
Preston L. Handy 
Attorneys for Respondent 
G:\EDSI\DOCS\06016\2347\AH8262 WPD 
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This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
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Third District, Salt Lake Department 
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Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and Jackson. 
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge: 
%1 Dixon Wong appeals the trial court's order granting Allstate 
Insurance Company's (Allstate) Motion to Modify Arbitrator's 
Award. Wong argues that the trial court erred by (1) modifying 
the arbitrator's award to conform to the underinsured policy 
limits and (2) considering extrinsic evidence to conclude that 
the arbitrator had exceeded nis authority. 
BACKGROUND 
%2 On June 1, 2002, Wong sustained serious injuries in an 
automobile accident in which the other driver was at fault. Wong 
recovered $50,000 from the other driver's liability policy and 
$10,690 from his own personal injury protection (PIP) insurance. 
Wong subsequently filed a claim under his underinsured motorist 
policy with Allstate. Wong's policy has a recovery limit of 
$100,000 per person. Allstate disputed the amount of damages 
claimed by Wong. Thus, the parties agreed to submit their 
dispute to arbitration1 and signed two documents: (1) an 
Arbitration Agreement and (2) a Binding Arbitration Agreement. 
1J3 The Arbitration Agreement, drafted by counsel for Allstate,2 
originally contained a high/low clause which stated that "[t]he 
parties agree to be bound by a high/low agreement with a high of 
$100,000 and a low of $0.00. The terms of this high/low 
agreement shall not be disclosed to the arbitrator." However, 
counsel for Wong crossed out the first line of the proposed 
agreement and reference to the high/low agreement in the second 
line so that the clause read: "The terms of this agreement shall 
not be disclosed to the arbitrator." Counsel for Wong signed and 
returned the Arbitration Agreement to counsel for Allstate who 
also signed it with all references to the high/low agreement 
crossed out. The remaining provisions in the Arbitration 
Agreement addressed only the rules and procedures for conducting 
the arbitration. 
H4 On March 18, 2002, the parties signed the Binding 
Arbitration Agreement, which defined the nature of the dispute to 
be arbitrated as "underinsured motorist claim--damages." On May 
14, 2002, counsel for Wong sent a letter to Allstate's counsel 
confirming their agreement that the dispute would be arbitrated 
without a high/low agreement in place and without making the 
arbitrator aware of the Arbitration Agreement or the policy 
limits. On May 15, 2002, counsel for Allstate replied by letter 
affirming their agreement not to submit a high/low provision to 
the arbitrator but also indicating Allstate's position that Wong 
is bound by the $100,000 policy limit regardless of the amount 
the arbitrator awards. 
1|5 The arbitration hearing was held the following day, May 16, 
2 002. Neither party introduced Wong's insurance policy or any 
evidence regarding policy limits, and the arbitrator did not 
request that information. The arbitrator found that Wong had 
suffered $321,616.85 in damages and awarded a net amount of 
$260,926,84 after subtracting the liability coverage and PIP 
benefits previously paid to Wong. 
H6 When Wong refused to accept Allstate's tender of $100,000, 
Allstate timely filed a Motion to Vacate Arbitrator's Award, or 
in the Alternative, Motion for Modification of Arbitrator's 
1. There is no evidence that Wong's insurance policy with 
Allstate contained an arbitration clause. Rather, it appears 
that both parties agreed to arbitration after the dispute arose. 
2. At the arbitration, counsel for Allstate was Leonard E. McGee 
and counsel for Wong was Preston L. Handy. 
Award. Allstate provided the trial court an affidavit from an 
Allstate insurance adjuster and the declarations page of Wong's 
policy as evidence of the $100,000 policy limit. After a hearing 
on Allstate's motion, the trial court found that "the arbitrator 
exceeded his authority and power by entering an award in excess 
of $100,000, that the award is beyond the reasonable 
contemplation of the parties, and that award lacks adequate 
foundation in reason or fact." The court ordered that the 
arbitrator's award be modified to conform to the policy limits of 
$10 0,000. Wong appeals. 
ISSUE AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
[^7 Wong asserts that the trial court erred by granting 
Allstate's motion to modify the arbitration award because the 
arbitrator did not exceed his authority in awarding an amount 
greater than Wong's underinsured motorist policy limit. There 
are two standards applicable to the review of arbitration awards: 
the standard applied by the trial court in reviewing the 
arbitration award and the standard applied in an appellate review 
of the trial court's decision. See Softsolutions, Inc. v. 
Brigham Young Univ., 2000 UT 46,^10, 1 P.3d 1095. "The standard 
of review for a trial court 'is an extremely narrow one' giving 
1
"considerable leeway to the arbitrator,"' and setting aside the 
arbitrator's decision '"only in certain narrow circumstances."'" 
Id. (quoting Buzas Baseball, Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 
925 P.2d 941, 947 (Utah 1996) (other citation omitted)). 
Further, "[t]he trial court 'may not substitute its judgment for 
that of the arbitrator, nor may it modify or vacate an award 
because it disagrees with the arbitrator's assessment.'" Id. 
(quoting Buzas Baseball, Inc., 925 P.2d at 947) . 
%8 "In reviewing the order of the district court confirming, 
vacating, or modifying an arbitration award, we grant no 
def srsPcQ *~o the court' s conclusions of "^  aw r°view^ no "^H^ TTI for 
correctness." Id. at Hl2. In particular, our "scope of review 
is limited to the legal issue of whether the trial court 
correctly exercised its authority in confirming, vacating, or 
modifying an arbitration award." Intermountain Power Agency v. 
Union Pac. R.R. Co., 961 P.2d 320, 323 (Utah 1998). 
ANALYSIS 
1(9 Wong asserts that the trial court erred by modifying the 
arbitrator's award and by considering extrinsic evidence in 
interpreting the scope of the parties' submission. Under the 
Utah Arbitration Act (the Act), see Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-31a-l to 
-20 (2002),3 a trial court must vacate an arbitration "award if 
it appears . . . the arbitrators exceeded their powers." Id. § 
78-31a-14(l) (c) .4 The Act also requires a trial court to "modify 
or correct the award if it appears [that] . . . the arbitrators' 
award is based on a matter not submitted to them, if the award 
can be corrected without affecting the merits of the award upon 
the issues submitted." Id. § 78-31a-15 (1) (b) (emphasis added).5 
3. The Act was repealed and a new Chapter 31a was enacted in its 
place effective May 15, 2003. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-31a-101 
to -131 (2002) . 
4. The full text of that former provision provides: 
(1) Upon motion to the court by any party to 
the arbitration proceeding for vacation of 
the award, the court shall vacate the award 
if it appears: 
(a) the award was procured by 
corruption, fraud, or other undue means; 
(b) an arbitrator, appointed as a 
neutral, showed partiality, or an arbitrator 
was guilty of misconduct that prejudiced the 
rights of any party; 
(c) the arbitrators exceeded their 
powers; 
(d) the arbitrators refused to postpone 
the hearing upon sufficient cause shown, 
refused to hear evidence material to the 
controversy, or otherwise conducted the 
hearing to the substantial prejudice of the 
rights of a party; or 
(e) there was no arbitration agreement 
between the parties to the arbitration 
proceeding. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-14(1) (2002). 
5. The full text of that former provision provides: 
(1) Upon motion made within 2 0 days after a 
copy of the award is served upon the moving 
party, the court shall modify or correct the 
award if it appears: 
(a) there was an evident miscalculation 
of figures or an evident mistake in the 
description of any person or property 
referred to in the award; 
(b) the arbitrators' award is based on a 
matter not submitted to them, if the award 
can be corrected without affecting the merits 
(continued...) 
Here, the trial court found that under section 78-31a-14(l)(c), 
the arbitrator exceeded his authority. Rather than vacating the 
award as required by the Act, the trial court modified it to 
conform to Wong's underinsured motorist policy limits. We 
conclude this was error. 
HlO Allowing the trial court to vacate that portion of the 
arbitration award which exceeds the limits of Wong's insurance 
policy actually modifies the award without determining whether 
modification is warranted under the Act. Where a trial court 
determines that an arbitrator exceeds his authority, the proper 
remedy is to vacate the entire award and "order a rehearing 
before new arbitrators chosen as provided in the arbitration 
agreement or by the court." Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-14(3). 
Kll While this is an issue of first impression in Utah, 
addressing the statutory provisions separately is consistent with 
Utah case law. In Softsolutions v. Brigham Young University, 
2000 UT 46, 1 P.3d 1095, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the 
trial court's order denying the appellant's motion to vacate or, 
in the alternative, modify an arbitration award. See id. at f57. 
The court held that under the Act, a trial court must vacate an 
arbitration award if it appears that the arbitrator exceeded his 
authority. See id. at ^15. The court explained that for a trial 
court to conclude an arbitrator exceeded his authority it must 
"(1) review the submission agreement and determine that the 
'arbitrator's award covers areas not contemplated by the 
submission agreement,' or (2) determine that an award is 'without 
foundation in reason or fact.'" Id. (quoting Buzas Baseball, 
Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 925 P.2d 941, 950 (Utah 1996) 
(other quotations and citations omitted)). In a separate 
paragraph, the court stated that the Act requires a trial court 
"to modify an arbitration award if it appears that 'the 
arbitrators' award is based on a matter not submitted to them, if 
the award can be corrected without affecting the merits of the 
award upon the issues submitted.'" Id. at [^16 (quoting Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-31a-15(l)(b) (1996)). The court then addressed each 
claim separately under the two statutory provisions. See id. at 
11117-39. 
1|l2 Because the trial court in the instant case modified, rather 
than vacated, the arbitration award, we must examine whether the 
modification was appropriate under section 78-31a-15 (1) . In 
particular, we must determine whether the trial court could have 
5. (...continued) 
of the award upon the issues submitted; or 
(c) the award is imperfect as to form. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-15(l) (2002). 
o r\ r\ 
found that the arbitrator's "award [was] based on a matter not 
submitted to [him]" and, if so, whether the award "can be 
corrected without affecting the merits of the award upon the 
issues submitted." Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-15(l)(b). 
Kl3 First, the trial court could have found that the arbitrator 
based his award on a matter not presented in the parties' 
submission agreement. The Binding Arbitration Agreement states 
that the issue to be addressed by the arbitrator is "underinsured 
motorist claim--damages." It does not state that any other 
matters are to be addressed such as the specific amount Allstate 
must pay Wong under his underinsured motorist insurance policy. 
The arbitrator correctly determined that Wong had suffered a 
total of $321,616.85 in damages. However, the arbitrator also 
decided the net amount to be paid to Wong by Allstate, a "matter 
not submitted to [him]." Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-15(l)(b). In 
particular, the arbitrator reduced the total amount of damages by 
$60,690.00 for liability coverage and PIP benefits previously 
paid and awarded Wong a net amount of $260,926.84. However, the 
matter submitted to the arbitrator was the total amount of 
damages incurred by Wong without regard to policy limits or other 
set-off amounts. Therefore, had the trial court examined the 
Binding Arbitration Agreement and the arbitration award, it could 
have reasonably concluded that the arbitrator's award was based 
on a matter not submitted to him. 
Kl4 Second, the trial court could have corrected the award 
without affecting the merits of the award upon the issue 
submitted to arbitration by the parties. See id. Specifically, 
because the arbitrator determined what damages Wong suffered 
prior to calculating the net amount awarded, the trial court 
could have modified the award to reflect the only issue properly 
before the arbitrator: damages suffered by Wong without regard 
to policy limits or other set-off amounts. Therefore, we hold 
that the trial court could have corrected the award without 
affecting the merits upon the matter submitted to arbitration. 
Accordingly, the trial court should have modified the 
arbitrator's award to reflect the matter submitted to arbitration 
and entered the total amount of damages incurred by Wong as 
$321,616.85. 
j^l5 However, the total amount of damages incurred by Wong has no 
bearing on the maximum amount Allstate could pay Wong pursuant to 
his underinsured motorist policy. The trial court held that 
the underinsured motorist policy constitutes 
a contract, and . . . the policy limits of 
$100,000 define the outer extent of exposure 
to [Allstate] on a claim for underinsured 
motorist benefits. . . . The Arbitration 
Agreement did not operate to open or modify 
the terms of the insurance contract. . . . 
The court finds that the insurance policy 
limits of $100,000 constitute a contractual 
determination of the parties, which are not 
modified or altered by virtue of the 
arbitration agreements. 
We agree. There is no evidence that the parties intended the 
prior contractual relationship to be modified by either the 
Arbitration Agreement or the Binding Arbitration Agreement. In 
fact, correspondence between the parties just prior to the 
arbitration evidences the opposite intent. Therefore, while the 
trial court should have modified the arbitration agreement to 
reflect the matter submitted to the arbitrator, the trial court 
correctly found that the arbitration did not modify the original 
contractual obligations of the parties and ordered that Allstate 
pay Wong $100,000 pursuant to his insurance policy.6 
Accordingly, we affirm.7 
m. 
Judith M. Billings, 
Presiding Judge 
fl6 WE CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
Norman H. Jackson ^ % d g 6 
6. However, a better way to reach the same correct result would 
have been for Allstate to file a declaratory action asking the 
court to determine the effect of the arbitrator's award on 
Allstatefs obligation to pay Wong, its insured under the policy. 
7. Wong also seeks attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
section 78-31a-16 (2003) . Because we affirm, attorney fees are 
not warranted. 
